【摘要】 作为我国行政监督的一种重要创新模式,国家向地方派驻中央督察机构,代表中央政府行使对地方公共资源的监管。本文试图回答:派驻机构是否存在驻地效应?具体而言,中央派驻机构驻地的督察效果,是否优于非驻地地区?利用国家土地督察的准自然实验特征,估计结果发现,中央派驻机构存在显著的驻地效应,土地督察局驻地地区的土地违法涉案面积比非驻地地区减少约36%。进一步检验发现,驻地效应的产生来自中央派驻机构本身的威慑力。更多还原

【Abstract】 Based on a quasi-natural experiment of State Land Supervision, we explore whether the government station effect exists, specifically, whether the effectiveness of the State Land Supervision at the station area is better than that of outside of the station. We apply the difference-in-differences method and find that there exists a significant government station effect in land supervisor. The illegal land area in the inspectorate station area is approximately 36% less than that of outside of the station. Moreover, we find that the government station effect is due to the central authority and the deterrence of inspectorate station.更多还原